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Abstract:
I study the impact of ”say on pay” (SoP) on the compensation decisions and the structure of the
board of directors (BoD) in a setting where the CEO has the real authority over the composition
of the BoD. The CEO’s authority arises endogenously from an informational advantage about
individual board members’ contribution to firm value and allows her to establish a dependent BoD.
Shareholders approve the CEO’s director slate because they can only control the level of board
dependence but not the board’s contribution to firm value. In this setting, SoP has two eﬀects. On
the one hand, it prompts a BoD with a given dependence level to reduce the CEO’s bonus. On the
other hand, it allows the CEO to extract the rent generated by the improved compensation policy
and to establish a more dependent BoD. In equilibrium the board becomes more dependent from the
CEO and pays her a higher bonus for the same performance. This outcome can only be avoided
if the CEO is restricted in her ability to adjust the board composition. Motivated by existing
diﬀerences in SoP design, I also analyze the consequences of a binding and a pre-contractual vote.
I find that a binding vote creates a moral hazard problem on the part of the firm’s shareholders
if the vote takes place after the agent has supplied her eﬀort. Its consequences critically depend
on the legal protection standard of the CEO. Whenever the shareholders can enforce a retroactive
bonus cut, the allowable amount of the bonus reduction determines whether or not SoP improves
the eﬃciency of the pay process or diminishes firm value. I show that the moral hazard problem
can be avoided by a pre-contractual vote. If the vote is binding, SoP can improve the eﬃciency
of the compensation arrangement and eﬀectively reduce the equilibrium level of board dependence
without impairing the CEO’s eﬀort incentives.
Keywords: Say on Pay, Executive Compensation, Board Dependence, Corporate Gover-
nance.
JEL Classification: G34, G38, K22, M12, M48.
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1 Introduction
1.1 Motivation and overview of main results
In an attempt to improve the compensation practice in publicly listed firms, the U.S. as
well as several European countries have recently introduced shareholder votes on the com-
pensation of executives, also referred to as “say on pay” (henceforth SoP). According to its
proponents, SoP is thought to facilitate the communication between shareholders and the
board of directors (henceforth BoD) on compensation issues and to strengthen the BoD’s
responsibility towards its shareholders.1 By this means SoP should ideally make the com-
pensation policy of public firms less dependent from the interests of their executives and
discourage the use of pay practices that are not in the best interest of shareholders.
Since ineﬃcient compensation arrangements such as a poor link between pay and perfor-
mance and excessive compensation levels seem to be more pronounced in firms with weak
governance structures, SoP can be expected to be most eﬀective in firms where the CEO
has some power over the board of directors.2 In this paper, I show that this view might be
wrong and that SoP can have exactly the opposite consequences. Namely, SoP can reduce
the eﬃciency of compensation contracts, aggravate existing governance problems, and di-
minish shareholder value. I demonstrate these problems in the context of an agency model
with three risk neutral players: the CEO, the BoD, and the firm’s shareholders. The CEO
must be motivated to exert productive eﬀort in order to increase the firm’s profit. An agency
problem arises because she is protected by limited liability.
The decision on the agent’s compensation contract is in the hands of the BoD. Its com-
position is determined as the equilibrium of a non-cooperative game between the CEO and
the firm’s shareholders. The CEO can use her influence to propose a director slate that must
be approved by the firm’s shareholders. Potential board members diﬀer in their ability to
contribute to firm value and their dependence from the CEO. The degree of independence
is common knowledge but only the CEO can evaluate the potential contributions of indi-
vidual board members. This informational advantage is the source of the CEO’s power over
1 See e.g. European Commission (2004) or Gordon (2009, p.337) who defines the role of SoP as ”to buttress
boards independence-in-fact by making them more accountable.”
2 See e.g. Bebchuk and Fried (2003, 2004), or Bertrand and Mullainathan (2000, 2001). A critical discuss-
sion of executive compensation pratices in the U.S. can be found in Kaplan (2008) and Bogle (2008).
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the BoD. It allows her to combine the two qualities of board members in a manner that
makes a dependent BoD attractive to shareholders. Due to the lack of information on the
contribution of individual board members, shareholders cannot implement an eﬃcient board
structure but only threaten to establish an independent BoD with an expected contribution
of zero.
The key variable in the model is the level of board dependence. The CEO is interested in
a more dependent BoD because it partly considers her utility in designing the compensation
contract and oﬀers her a higher bonus for a given performance. To make a dependent BoD
acceptable to shareholders, the CEO composes the BoD so that its contribution to firm value
is positively related to the level of board dependence. Faced with the trade-oﬀ between an
increasing contribution to firm value and higher compensation cost, shareholders accept a
dependent board. The equilibrium level of board dependence is determined by the point
where the shareholders attain the same utility as with their outside option of replacing the
CEO’s director slate with an independent BoD.
In this setting, the introduction of a vote on the CEO’s compensation has a direct and
an indirect eﬀect. First, a BoD with a given dependence level reduces the CEO’s bonus for
a given firm performance. It does so because the board members derive a disutility from a
negative shareholder vote and the shareholders’ voting dissent is increasing in the agent’s
compensation. Second, since the CEO has the real authority over the composition of the
BoD and the shareholders face the same outside option, she can extract the rent generated
by the improved compensation policy and establish a more dependent BoD. As a matter of
fact the board becomes more dependent from the CEO and pays her a higher compensation
for the same level of performance. This outcome can only be avoided if the CEO is restricted
in her ability to adjust the board composition.
The standard SoP model used in the U.S. and the U.K. gives shareholders an advisory
vote on the CEO’s compensation after the firm’s result are realized. As explained in more
detail in section 1.2, there are important international diﬀerences in SoP design, especially
regarding its enforceability and its timing. To analyze how changes of the basic SoP model
aﬀect the compensation decisions of the BoD and the level of board dependence, I provide
two extensions of my basic model. First, I examine the consequences of a binding SoP and
second, I analyze the impact of a pre-contractual vote.
I find that a binding vote creates a moral hazard problem on the part of the firm’s
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shareholders if the timing of the standard model is maintained. Since the vote takes place
after the agent has supplied her eﬀort, shareholders have an incentive to refuse the CEO’s
bonus payment. A rational CEO anticipates the threat of an expropriation by the firm’s
shareholders and adjusts her eﬀort accordingly. As a matter of fact the consequences of a
binding SoP critically depend on the legal protection standard of the CEO. If shareholders
cannot impair existing contractual arrangement between the BoD and the CEO, a binding
SoP oﬀers no advantage over an advisory vote. If the shareholders can only enforce moderate
bonus cuts, a binding SoP can improve the eﬃciency of the pay setting process and limit
the equilibrium level of board dependence. However, if all bonus payments are subject to
shareholder approval, the threat of a retroactive pay cut completely destroys the agent’s
eﬀort incentives and diminishes firm value.
The moral hazard problem can be avoided if the vote on the compensation takes place
before the BoD signs the compensation contract with the agent. If the pre-contractual
vote is advisory, the change of the timing has not much impact on the equilibrium of the
game except for a weakly higher voting dissent. If the pre-contractual vote is binding,
shareholders can force the BoD to improve the eﬃciency of the compensation arrangement
and eﬀectively reduce the equilibrium level of board dependence. Since the vote takes place
before the contract is signed, these eﬀects are not caused by a moral hazard problem but by
the requirement to find the shareholders’ majority support for the SoP proposal.
These findings suggest that SoP design can have a significant impact not only on the
equilibrium degree of board dependence and the level of executive compensation but also
on the utilities of the players. On these grounds the enforceability and the timing of SoP
are also critical for its ability to improve the pay setting process in weakly governed firms
and to contribute to shareholder value. The standard approach of an advisory SoP usually
leaves the shareholders’ utility unaﬀected and can only add to shareholder value if the CEO
is restricted in her ability to extract the surplus. By contrast, the consequences of a post-
contractual binding SoP critically depend on the legal protection standard of the CEO. There
are conditions under which shareholders strictly benefit from a binding SoP but there is also
a minimum protection standard below which a binding SoP diminishes firm value. This risk
is usually excluded with a pre-contractual vote but it is not guaranteed that shareholders
strictly benefit from such a step. If the vote is advisory, the shareholders typically attain
the same utility as with a post-contractual SoP. If the vote is binding, shareholders attain
a higher utility whenever the compensation paid with an advisory vote is not supported by
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the majority of shareholders.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next subsection provides an overview
of the institutional background and a review of the related literature. Section 2 explains the
model assumptions and the structure of the multi-stage game. Section 3 derives the optimal
contract and the equilibrium board structure in the absence of SoP. Section 4 analyzes the
impact of the standard advisory SoP model on the equilibrium of the multi-stage-game.
Section 5 extends the analysis and examines first the consequences of a binding SoP, second
the impact of a pre-contractual vote, and third the implications of SoP design for regulatory
policy. Section 6 concludes the analysis with a summary of the main results and some
suggestions for further research.
1.2 Institutional background and related literature
The first SoP legislation was introduced in 2002 in the U.K. where listed firms are required
to submit an annual remuneration report to an advisory vote at the annual shareholder
meeting.3 The U.S. introduced a similar regulation with the Dodd-Franck Act in 2010.
Starting with the 2011 reporting season, it asks public firms in the U.S. to provide share-
holders at least every three years with the opportunity to give a non-binding vote on the
compensation of the executives for which the compensation must be disclosed in the firm’s
proxy statements.4
In recent years, several European countries adopted similar rules. According to a report of
the European Commission (2010), a total of 19 out of the 27 member states of the European
Union have either introduced mandatory legal provisions or at least recommendations in
their local corporate governance codes requiring shareholder votes on the remuneration of
executives. The report shows important disparities not only concerning the legal basis but
also with respect to the practical implementation of SoP, most importantly with regard to
the enforceability, the subject and the timing of the shareholder vote.
Diﬀerent from the Anglo-Saxon model of an advisory SoP, the majority of European
SoP adopters has actually introduced binding shareholder votes.5 Moreover, a substantial
3 See The Directors Remuneration Report Regulations (2002) for details.
4 See Larcker et al (2012) for a detailed record of the SoP legislation in the U.S. and Glass, Lewis & Co.
(2011) for a report on the voting results in the first proxy season.
5 In fact, 13 out of the 19 SoP adopters within Europe require a binding shareholder vote. Only 4 countries
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fraction of the newly introduced voting rights do not refer to the annual compensation
report but to the firm’s compensation policy or to the actual remuneration of executives.
For example, countries such as the Netherlands and Sweden have adopted a binding SoP
vote on the firms’ compensation systems, whereas Switzerland is confronted with a public
voting initiative proposing a binding vote on the actual compensation of executives.6 Since
votes on the compensation policy apply to future compensation arrangements and not to the
compensation paid out during the current reporting period, the diﬀerent subject of the vote
also implies a diﬀerent timing. These observations suggest that there is no unique approach
to SoP and underscore the relevance of a better understanding of the economic incentives
generated by diﬀerent SoP designs.7
Due to the fact that SoP is a relatively recent phenomenon, the economic literature
on the topic is limited. There are a couple of empirical studies that analyze the relation
between advisory SoP and executive pay using data from the U.K.8 These analyses suggest
that higher compensation levels trigger a higher voting dissent on the part of shareholders,
but they provide mixed results on the consequences of a negative shareholder vote. Alissa
(2009) finds that a high voting dissent seems to curb extreme cases of excess compensation.
Both, Carter and Zamora (2009) and Ferri and Maber (2012) find a positive relation between
voting dissent and the pay-for-performance-sensitivity in later periods, particularly in the
case of poor performance.
Ferri and Maber (2012) also find that a high voting dissent seems to motivate boards to
remove controversial provisions from compensation contracts. They report further that firms
often adjust contracts before the advisory SoP is conducted in order to avoid a disapproval of
questionable compensation arrangements by shareholders. Larcker et al. (2012) make similar
observations for the U.S. but they attribute the changes in firms’ compensation programs
to the threat of receiving a negative voting recommendation from one of the major proxy
rely on a pure advisory vote and 2 countries allow for both types of votes, see European Commission
(2010) for details.
6 See European Commission (2010). Wagner and Wenk (2011) as well as Economist (2007) provide a
detailed account of the legislative process in Switzerland.
7 Gordon (2009, p. 337) classsifies the available design options along “....four binary choices: (1) ‘before’
versus ‘after’, (2) ‘binding’ versus ‘advisory’, (3) ‘general’ versus ‘specific’ compensation plans, and (4)
‘mandatory’ versus ‘firm-optional’.”
8 See Alissa (2009), Carter and Zamora (2009), Conyon and Sadler (2010) as well as Ferri and Maber
(2012). A recent survey of the the SoP literature is provided by Go¨x and Kunz (2012).
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advisor firms. Moreover, the study of Larcker et al. (2012) suggests that the changes in firms’
compensation programs induced by SoP are associated with a negative stock market reaction
and conclude that the voting recommendations of proxy advisors can trigger compensation
policies that diminish firm value.
Unlike other empirical studies, Conyon and Sadler (2010) do not find any evidence for the
hypotheses that a negative shareholder vote aﬀects the compensation structure or reduces
the overall level of executive pay. Moreover, consistent with the results of the theoretical
analysis in section 4, they even find a weak positive relation between voting dissent and total
CEO compensation. This observation is confirmed in a laboratory experiment conducted
by Go¨x et al. (2010). In this study, shareholders face the problem of motivating a risky
investment decision of a CEO who has partial control over the terms of her own incentive
compensation. The experiment analyzes the eﬀectiveness of post-contractual SoP in solving
the resulting trade-oﬀ between rent extraction and goal congruent project selection. As long
as SoP is advisory, it motivates higher rent extraction by the CEO but does not aﬀect the
CEO’s investment incentives as compared to a world without SoP.
Go¨x et al. (2010) also show that a post-contractual binding SoP provides shareholders
with an eﬀective instrument to control the agent’s compensation but that it destroys the
agent’s investment incentives and thereby significantly reduces the firm’s profit. These find-
ings are consistent with the predictions regarding the impact of a post-contractual binding
SoP in the absence of legal protection standards for the CEO. Empirical support for the
potential risks associated with this SoP method is provided by Wagner and Wenk (2011).
These authors analyze the reaction of capital market participants to the announcement of a
public voting initiative proposing a post-contractual binding SoP for listed firms in Switzer-
land. They find abnormal negative price reactions for two thirds of the firms in their sample
suggesting that shareholders understand the fundamental problems associated with a post-
contractual binding SoP.9
This paper contributes to the literature by providing the first theoretical analysis of
the relation between SoP design, executive compensation and board dependence. Earlier
theoretical studies such as Drymiotes (2007), Kumar and Sivaramakrishnan (2008), and Laux
9 See Cai and Walkling (2011) for a similar study regarding the announcement eﬀect of an advisory SoP
bill in the U.S where they find positive market reactions for firms with ineﬃcient compensation practices.
They also analyze the market reaction to company-specific SoP-proposals and find a negative impact of
labor union-sponsored proposals.
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and Mittendorf (2011) have analyzed the cost and benefits of delegating the compensation
decision to a partially dependent boards in settings where the BoD also monitors the CEO’s
activities or where it must provide incentives to identify profitable investment incentives.
In all these studies, a partially dependent BoD oﬀers some net contribution to firm value,
albeit for diﬀerent economic reasons.10 However, none of these studies has so far analyzed
the relation between shareholder votes on the remuneration of executives and the equilibrium
composition of the board of directors.
The study is also related to Levit and Malenko (2011). These authors analyze the role
of non-binding votes on shareholder proposals as a mechanism to convey the expectation
of shareholders to the CEO and find that non-binding votes are generally less eﬀective in
this respect than binding votes. Levit and Malenko (2011) neither consider an incentive
contracting problem nor a BoD. They also assume a diﬀerent information structure. In their
model the shareholders are better informed about the prospects of their proposal than the
CEO. Since the vote takes place before the CEO decides on the proposal, she can update
her beliefs after observing the voting outcome and make a better informed project decision.
In a broader sense, both models are related to Aghion and Tirole (1997) who identify the
information structure as the critical factor determining the formal and the real authority in
organizations. In my model, the shareholders have the formal authority over the composition
of the BoD but the CEO has the real authority because of her superior information about
the contribution of individual board members. In Levit and Malenko (2011) the CEO has
the formal authority to decide over the shareholder proposal but shareholders can obtain the
real authority by conveying decision relevant information to the CEO in a pre-contractual
shareholder vote.
10 From a broader perspective, this paper also contributes to the literature on endogenously determined
boards of directors. See Hermalin and Weisbach (1998, 2003), Adams and Ferreira (2007), as well as
Adams et al. (2010) for a recent survey.
9
2 Model assumptions
2.1 Firm setup, technology, and compensation system
I consider an agency-relation between three risk neutral parties: a group of shareholders
(the ”principal”), a board of directors (”BoD”), and a CEO (the ”agent”). The agent’s
personal eﬀort a, a ∈ [0, 1], aﬀects the distribution of the firm’s results. There are two
possible outcomes, xH and xL. The probabilities of the high and the low result depend on
the agent’s eﬀort and are given by p(xH |a) = a and p(xL|a) = 1 − a, respectively. That
is, the higher the agent’s eﬀort, the higher the likelihood of a high outcome and the higher
the expected result, E[x] = xL + a · ∆x, where ∆x = xH − xL > 0. The amount of eﬀort
spent on improving the distribution of the firm’s results is the agent’s private information
and not contractible. Eﬀort is personally costly to the agent. The cost equals C(a), where
I assume that C(a) satisfies the Inada conditions (C(0) = C 0(0) = 0, C 0(1) = +∞) and is
monotonically increasing and strictly convex in a to assure that the incentive problem has a
non-trivial solution.
For some exogenous reasons shareholders are not in a position to design the agent’s
compensation contract and delegate this task to the BoD. To focus on the role of SoP
on the CEO’s compensation, I let the BoD receive a salary wB but no performance-based
compensation for its services. I subsequently normalize wB to zero. To motivate the agent,
the BoD oﬀers her a contract s(x) that comprises a salary w and a bonus b in case of good
performance. From these assumptions, the agent’s expected remuneration equals E[s(x)] =
w + a · b and her expected utility is
E[UA] = w + a · b− C(a). (1)
An agency problem arises from the agent’s limited liability. Particularly, I assume that the
agent’s compensation cannot fall below the amount of w, where xL > w ≥ 0. The income
level w can be interpreted as the minimum income that the agent can attain without exerting
a positive eﬀort level.11 The minimum income must be distinguished from the reservation
11 See e.g. Poblete and Spulber (2012) for a corresponding asumption. Other limited liabilty models assume
that the agent’s pay can become negative but cannot fall below an exogenously given wealth level −L < 0.
See e.g. Laﬀont and Martimort (2002), pp. 155. Letting w < 0 would not change results. I choose w ≥ 0
because negative executive compensation is uncommon and since the minimum pay interpretation is more
convenient in terms of the research question.
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utility U ≥ 0 that the agent receives from her next best employment alternative. While w
puts a lower bound on the agent’s pay, U restricts the agent’s expected utility from below.
In what follows, U is normalized to zero so that w ≥ U.
2.2 Governance structure
A necessary condition for a non-trivial economic analysis of SoP is the presence of ineﬃ-
ciencies in the pay-setting process, otherwise the regulation cannot provide any benefits to
shareholders. Inspired by the managerial power approach, I consider a firm in which the
CEO has some control over the nomination of individual directors and thereby over the
composition of the BoD. Since the BoD is responsible for designing the agent’s compensa-
tion contract, the CEO’s power over the BoD allows her to (indirectly) influence her own
pay.12 In line with recent literature I model a potentially dependent BoD that balances the
interests of shareholders and the CEO in setting the agent’s compensation according to the
following objective function13
VB = (1− λ) · UP + λ · UA, (2)
where UP is the utility of the principal and λ measures the degree of board dependence. The
level of board dependence represents the aggregate preferences of a given mix of independent
and dependent directors sitting on the firm’s board. Let the BoD have a fixed size of n
members and let λi,λi ∈ [0, 1/2], denote the dependence level of the ith director, then the
average dependence level of the BoD is λ = 1/n ·Pλi. That is, the higher the fraction of
dependent board members, the higher is λ and the more the board considers the agent’s
utility in designing the compensation contract. Limiting λi and thereby λ to take values
from the interval [0, 1/2] avoids scenarios in which the CEO’s interest dominates shareholder
interest.14
12 In fact, Bebchuk and Fried (2004) identify the CEO’s influence on the nomination of directors as the
main source of ineﬃciency in the pay-setting process.
13 See e.g. Drymiotes (2007), Kumar und Sivaramakrishnan (2008), and Laux and Mittendorf (2011).
14 See Laux and Mittendorf (2011) for a corresponding assumption. Essentially, this restriction assures that
the agent’s compensation enters with a negative sign into the board’s objective function. In fact, since
s(x) enters negatively into the principal’s utility function and positively into the agent’s utility function
the net weight on the agent’s compensation in (2) equals ψ(λ) = −(1− 2λ).
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The equilibrium degree of board dependence is determined by the CEO and the firm’s
shareholders as the outcome of a multi-stage game. The full time line of this game is given
in figure 1 (see section 2.4). At stage one, the CEO proposes a director slate to the firm’s
shareholders. The candidates on the slate can be characterized along two dimensions: First,
their dependence on the CEO, and second, their potential to contribute to firm value.
The two qualities of potential directors can be related in many ways. For example, the
board can be mainly composed of outside directors that contribute to firm value but are
largely independent. A typical example are bankers who provide valuable financial expertise
but are usually not considered as being dependent from the CEO. Likewise, the presence of
venture capitalists on the BoD facilitates the firm’s financing opportunities but reportedly
reduces the CEO’ power over the board of directors. The CEO can also propose directors
that contribute to firm value but also increase the dependence level of the BoD. Examples
are insiders, such as former CEOs, or managers of peer firms on the BoD. On the one hand,
these directors typically possess industry-specific human capital and are capable of providing
valuable strategic advice. On the other hand they tend to be more supportive to the CEO
and to tolerate higher compensation levels.15
Apart from the joint occurrence of director qualities at the individual level, the con-
tribution of particular types of directors can also depend on the aggregate level of board
dependence. For example, the presence of compliance and audit experts is certainly most
eﬀective in firms with insuﬃcient internal control systems and weak governance structures.
Also, it has been found that the presence of labor representatives on the boards of public
firms negatively aﬀects firms’ investment decisions and productivity. Moreover, the resulting
valuation discounts seem to be more pronounced in firms with a significant level of employee
representation.16 These observations suggests that the impact of stakeholders on firm value
varies in a nontrivial way with the overall level of board dependence.
To capture these considerations in the model, let yi(λ) = (vi + ρi · λ)/n denote the
contribution of the ith board member. The parameter vi ∈ [−v, v], v > 0, denotes the
basic contribution of the ith board candidate, whereas ρi ∈ [−ρ, ρ], ρ > 0, is a measure for
potential synergies (dysergies) that arise from appointing candidate i to a board with a given
15 See Adams et al. (2010) for a detailed discussion of the potential impact of diﬀerent type of directors
and an overview of the existing empirical evidence on the subject.
16 See Adams et al. (2010) for details and further references.
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dependence level λ.17 With this structure, the aggregate contribution of the BoD becomes
y(λ) = v + ρ · λ, (3)
where v = 1/n · P vi and ρ = 1/n · P ρi. Since v and ρ can take any sign, the linear
specification in (3) is suitable for capturing a wide array of possible relations between the
board’s contribution to firm value and its dependence from the CEO.
Without loss of generality, I assume that λi is publicly observable so that λ is common
knowledge among all players. By contrast, the parameters determining the individual con-
tribution of candidates for the BoD, vi and ρi, are ex ante unknown with an expected value
of E[vi] = E[ρi] = 0. Unlike shareholders, the CEO can infer the potential contributions of
candidates for the BoD before putting them on the slate. Being responsible for the firm’s
strategy and overall performance, the CEO is in the best position to identify the firm’s
requirements and to compose a BoD that provides a maximum contribution to firm value.
In addition, the CEO can employ the firm’s resources to examine the qualities of poten-
tial board members before proposing their names to shareholders. In fact, the search and
evaluation of new board members is routinely performed by professional executive search
consultants acting on behalf of the companies that seek to fill board positions. Since the
CEO controls the firm’s financial resources, she can also claim priority access to the informa-
tion generated by the consultant or other advisors. By contrast, shareholders of large public
firms are typically not in a position to micro-manage the board structure. Identifying and
evaluating the qualities of potential directors is a demanding and time consuming task that
is too costly to carry out for individual shareholders and can hardly be coordinated among
diﬀerent (groups of) shareholders.18
Following these considerations, I subsequently assume that the CEO observes a costless
signal over the type of each candidate before composing the candidate list. For the ease of
exposition, the signal is supposed to perfectly reveal the actual values of vi and ρi.19 Based
17 The board’s contribution represents the net benefits that shareholders derive from its advice and its
monitoring eﬀorts. Since the focus of the model is the impact of SoP on executive pay and shareholder
value, I do not explicitly model the value creating activities of the BoD but take the contribution as
given. See e.g. Hermalin (2005), Adams and Ferreira (2007), or Kumar and Sivaramakrishnan (2008) for
more detailed models of board activities.
18 Consistent with these arguments Bebchuk and Fried (2004, p.25) report that there is virtually no evidence
of shareholders proposing their own list of candidates for the BoD.
19 The assumption that the signal is perfect serves to simplify the notation. All results would equivalently
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on this information, the CEO composes the director slate and truthfully communicates its
aggregate production function y(λ) to shareholders. Thus, since λ is common knowledge,
there is symmetric information about the properties of the BoD at the time the CEO makes
the slate public.
The exclusive access to the information about vi and ρi prior to composing the director
slate allows the CEO to aggregate her information on the contribution of individual board
members and to combine it with an appropriate level of λ in a manner that makes a dependent
BoD attractive to shareholders. Since the proposal reveals no information on the qualities
of individual directors or other candidates that have been considered for a board position,
the CEO has the power to make a take-it-or-leave-it oﬀer to the firm’s shareholders.
After the CEO has composed the director slate, the board proposal must be approved by
the firm’s shareholders. The shareholders aim to maximize the net value of the firm, given
by the diﬀerence between the contributions of the BoD and the agent and the expected
compensation. From the above assumptions, the shareholders’ expected utility equals
E[UP ] = y(λ) + xL − w + a · (∆x − b). (4)
The expression in (4) is increasing in the board’s contribution to firm value, y(λ), and the
agent’s eﬀort (a) but it is decreasing in the parameters of the compensation scheme, i.e. the
salary (w) and the bonus (b). Since the agent’s eﬀort depends on the size of the bonus and
the BoD determines the agent’s compensation by maximizing (2), the equilibrium levels of a
and b are functions of λ. That is, the critical variable determining the utility of shareholders
is the level of board dependence.
In the absence of SoP, the requirement of a shareholder approval for the director slate
is the only constraint imposed on the CEO’s power over the BoD. However, the eﬃcacy
of this instrument is limited because the shareholders are unable to solve the bundling task
performed by the CEO due to the lack of information on the individual contributions of board
members. That is, if the shareholders were to compose their own director slate, the expected
contribution of individual candidates would equal E[yi(λ)] = 0. However, since λ is common
knowledge, shareholders can credibly threaten to disapprove the CEO’s board proposal and
to nominate a BoD with the desired dependence level and an expected contribution of zero.
Doing so incurs a transaction cost of k ≥ 0.
go through if the CEO would observe a noisy but informative signals about vi and ρi.
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2.3 SoP votes and BoD concerns
Disapproving the director slate is an extreme measure and not well adapted for the share-
holders’ objective of signalling their dissatisfaction with the BoD’s compensation policy. The
introduction of SoP permits shareholders to address potential compensation issues more di-
rectly and to eventually resolve them without putting the current BoD into question. For the
main part of the analysis I consider an advisory vote on the CEO’s realized compensation
as it is mandatory for firms listed at major stock exchanges in the U.S. and in the U.K. In
a model extension, I also analyze the consequences of a binding vote as it is practiced in a
number of European countries.
There is a conceptual problem with an advisory vote on executive compensation. Even
if the majority of shareholders disagrees with its compensation policy, the BoD can simply
ignore the vote because it is not enforceable. Moreover, anticipating that their vote cannot
force the BoD to change its compensation policy, rational shareholders should not vote
against the compensation proposal in the first place. Even though these arguments are
theoretically appealing, they are inconsistent with recent empirical evidence.
Particularly, the data from the U.K. as well as those from the last two proxy seasons in
the U.S. convey two facts: First, although the vast majority of SoP proposals is supported
by a majority of shareholders, virtually no SoP proposal receives full shareholder support.
That is, despite the fact that their vote is seemingly irrelevant, a substantial fraction of
shareholders rejects SoP proposals.20 Moreover, the voting dissent is more pronounced for
firms with high compensation levels (Conyon and Sadler 2010), a poor link between pay
and performance (Ferri and Maber 2012), and for firms having received negative voting
recommendations from proxy advisors (Larcker et al. 2012). Second, boards actually seem
to consider the threat of a negative SoP vote in their compensation decisions despite the
fact that they are not forced to do so. Actually, Ferri and Maber (2012) as well as Larcker
et al. (2012) find that a number of firms has made important changes to their compensation
contracts before submitting the SoP proposal to shareholders.
These findings suggest that the advisory SoP mechanism works more subtly than standard
20 For example, Conyon and Sadler (2010) find a mean voting dissent of 7.61 % in a sample of 3,640 SoP
votes in the U.K. Likewise, Glass Lewis & Co (2011) report average support rates of 87.5 % for the S&P
500 companies and 90.1 % for the full sample of Russel 3000 firms in 2011. However, only 6 out of the
2658 firms in the sample provided 100 % support to the SoP proposal.
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theory predicts. SoP seems to motivate a certain fraction of shareholders to signal their
concerns about problematic compensation practices and at the same time it prompts boards
to propose less controversial compensation arrangements. To capture these considerations in
the context of my model, I subsequently assume that shareholders base their voting decision
on an individual evaluation of the BoD’s compensation policy and that the BoD derives
disutility from a negative shareholder vote.
More precisely, shareholders are supposed to compare the proposed compensation s(x)
with a benchmark pay level t and to disagree with any compensation s(x) exceeding t. The
benchmark pay can represent the average compensation paid by a sample of peer firms with
comparable performance or the shareholders’ individual perception of an appropriate com-
pensation level given the realized result. In fact, in the binary outcome model an increasing
pay level is equivalent to an inferior pay-for-performance relation.21 For firms relying on the
voting recommendations of proxy advisors, t can also represent the maximum pay level that
the proxy advisor would accept in order to provide a positive recommendation for the firm’s
SoP proposal.22 To allow for heterogeneity in shareholders’ reference points, I assume that t
is uniformly distributed over the interval [s, s], where s > s so that t has a strictly positive
density function. That is, all shareholders accept compensation levels less or equal to s and
refuse compensation levels above s. The upper bound s can take arbitrary values. To assure
that no shareholder rejects the minimum compensation that the firm must oﬀer the agent
in order to satisfy her limited liability constraint, I assume that s ≥ w.
The board’s disutility function takes the simple multiplicative form DB = θ · α, where
α ∈ [0, 1] denotes the percentage level of shareholder voting dissent realized in the SoP vote.
θ is a nonnegative parameter representing the BoD’s responsiveness to shareholder concerns
as well as the strictness of the regulatory environment. A strictly positive disutility can
arise from several risk factors faced by the BoD ranging from concerns about a negative
press coverage to an eventual shareholder litigation.23 Most importantly, boards failing to
react appropriately to a significant voting dissent in an SoP proposal face a significant risk
21 In the model, ineﬃcient compensation arrangements can only arise in the form of inflated bonus awards.
Since the bonus is paid in case of a good performance (x = xH) and the performance is fxed, an increase
of the pay level implies an inferior pay-for-performance ratio.
22 As Larcker et al. (2012) point out, many instutional investors such as mutual funds follow the voting
recommendations of proxy advisors instead of making their own evaluation of compensation policies in
their investment portfolio.
23 See Levit and Malenko (2011) for a detailed discussion and further examples of factors triggering the
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of not being reelected. In fact, proxy advisors routinely recommend to vote against the
reappointment of the compensation committee or even the full BoD if the firm has failed to
change its compensation policy after a substantially negative SoP vote.24
The higher the BoD’s responsiveness to shareholder concerns, the stricter the regulatory
environment, the higher the anticipated voting dissent, and the higher is the disutility of the
BoD. It can also be seen that the BoD incurs no disutility if either θ or α are zero. That
is, whenever the shareholders unanimously agree with the BoD’s compensation proposal, or
the BoD disregards the shareholders’ concerns about its pay policy, or if there is no SoP, no
disutility arises on the part of the BoD.
2.4 Order of moves
The board composition and the level of board dependence is determined as the equilibrium
of the multistage game exhibited in figure 1.
[please insert figure 1 about here]
At date 1, the CEO proposes a BoD with a given level of board dependence λ and an
aggregate contribution to firm value of y(λ) to shareholders. At date 2, the firm’s sharehold-
ers approve the CEO’s board proposal or replace it with their own director slate incurring
transaction cost k whenever it is profitable to do so. At date 3, the approved BoD designs
the CEO’s compensation contract and at date 4, the agent decides on the contract oﬀer and
makes her eﬀort decision. At date 5, the firm realizes its actual profit and at date 6, it pays
out the corresponding compensation to the agent.
The vote on the agent’s compensation takes place between dates 5 and 6, after the results
are realized but before the agent’s compensation is paid out. Since the vote is advisory, it
has no impact on the enforceability of the compensation contract signed at date 4 so that
the agent’s compensation is paid out according to the contractual terms specified at date 3.
It follows that the potential consequences of the advisory vote on the firm’s compensation
policy must already be reflected in the BoD’ contract proposal made at date 3.
eﬀectiveness of non-binding shareholder votes. A detailed analysis and discussion of the relation between
negative press coverage and executive pay is provided by Core et al. (2008).
24 ISS (2012) defines a voting dissent of more than 30 % as substantial, and, according to Larcker et al
(2012), Glass Lewis & Co fixes the hurdle at a voting dissent of 25 %.
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3 Optimal contract and BoD composition without SoP
3.1 First-best solution
As a benchmark case for the subsequent analysis of the multi-stage game I consider the
first-best solution of the agency problem. If eﬀort were contractible and the individual
contribution of board candidates were publicly observable, the principal could compose the
board without an eﬃciency loss and write a contract specifying the eﬀort level that maximizes
the joint surplus of the agency25
E[W ] = E[UP ] +E[UA] = y(λ) +E[x]− C(a). (5)
The surplus comprises the contribution of the BoD, the expected result and the agent’s
personal cost. The surplus maximizing eﬀort level is implicitly defined by the following first
order condition
∆x = C 0(aFB). (6)
According to (6) the first-best eﬀort is found by equating the agent’s marginal contribution
to the firm’s result with its marginal cost of eﬀort. Since eﬀort is contractible, the agent’s
compensation contract contains a salary but no bonus. Assuming that C(aFB) ≥ w, the
optimal contract satisfies the agent’s participation and her limited liability constraint,
E[s(x)]− C(a) ≥ 0 (7)
s(x) ≥ w ∀ x. (8)
Since C(aFB) ≥ w, the participation constraint is binding and stricter than the limited
liability constraint. It follows that the agent receives just her reservation utility.
The first-best composition of the BoD maximizes the contribution of all board members
in (3). Since v is the intercept and ρ the slope of (3), the BoD’s contribution function takes
its maximum value for a given value of λ if vi = v = v, and ρi = ρ = ρ. Since ρ > 0, the
resulting first-best contribution function, yFB(λ) = v + ρ · λ, is monotonically increasing in
λ so that λFB = 1/2.26
25 The surplus definition in (5) is standard in agency theory. Adding the BoD’s utility would imply double
counting because the BoD already maximizes a weighted average of the principal’s and the agent’s utility.
26 If eﬀort were contraticble, the shareholders could delegate the contracting task to the BoD without any
eﬃciency loss. Since VB(1/2) = W/2, the first best eﬀort level is also obtained if λ = 1/2 and the BoD
writes the contract on a.
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3.2 Second-best solution
3.2.1 Optimal contract for a given board structure
Since the agent’s eﬀort is not contractible, the compensation must not only assure a suﬃ-
cient pay level but also provide incentives to exert productive eﬀort. At date 3, the BoD
designs the optimal bonus contract by maximizing its objective function in (2) subject to the
limited liability constraint in (8), the agent’s participation constraint (7) and the incentive
constraint:
b = C 0(a). (9)
The incentive constraint in (9) stems from maximizing the agent’s expected utility in (1)
with respect to a and implicitly defines the agent’s optimal eﬀort choice as the eﬀort level
that equates the bonus with the marginal cost of eﬀort provision. Since C(a) is strictly
convex, the agent’s equilibrium eﬀort is monotonically increasing in the bonus. Solving the
BoD’s optimal contracting problem at date 3 yields the following result.
Lemma 1: The agent’s equilibrium eﬀort is monotonically increasing in the level of board
dependence. For λ < 1/2 the equilibrium eﬀort is implicitly defined by the following expres-
sion
a∗(λ) = h(λ) · ∆x − C
0(a)
C 00(a)
, h(λ) = 1− λ
1− 2 · λ , (10)
where the term h(λ) is monotonically increasing in λ. For λ = 1/2, a∗ = aFB. Proof: see
appendix.
Lemma 1 suggests that an increasing level of board dependence alleviates the agency
problem. The higher the level of board dependence, the closer is the agent’s equilibrium
eﬀort to the first-best eﬀort level. The optimal compensation contract is obtained by solving
(8) for the salary and (9) and (10) for the optimal bonus. As an immediate consequence
of lemma 1, we can make the following statement about the agent’s compensation without
giving a formal proof:
Corollary 1: The optimal compensation comprises a salary equal to the minimum pay level
and a bonus that is monotonically increasing in the level of board dependence:
w∗ = w, b∗(λ) = ∆x − a · C
00(a)
h(λ) . (11)
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That is, an increasing level of board dependence aﬀects the agent’s bonus but not her salary
so that in equilibrium, the performance-based part of the agent’s compensation is distorted
whenever λ > 0.
In the limited liability setting, the agency problem arises because the bonus determines
not only the agent’s eﬀort incentives but also the sharing of the surplus between the agent and
the principal. The total surplus generated by the agent’s eﬀort equals Π(a) = a ·∆x −C(a)
whereof the agent receives the share G(a) and the principal retains the share H(a). In
equilibrium, these shares are defined as follows
G(a) = a · C 0(a)− C(a), H(a) = a · (∆x − C 0(a)), (12)
where I use the fact that b = C 0(a) from the agent’s incentive constraint. From the assump-
tions about the cost function, G(a) is monotonically increasing whereas H(a) is strictly
concave in a.
To implement the first-best eﬀort, the principal must set the bonus equal to b = ∆x.
This solution cannot be optimal because it transfers the entire surplus to the agent. At
the other extreme, a bonus of zero would attribute the maximum share to the principal but
provide no eﬀort incentives. An independent BoD solves this trade-oﬀ in the best interest
of the principal by setting a bonus rate of b∗(0) = ∆x − a · C 00(a) and thereby implements
an equilibrium eﬀort level of a∗(0) = [∆x − C 0(a)]/C 00(a), the eﬀort level that maximizes
H(a). An increasing level of board dependence puts more weight on the agent’s share and
thereby mitigates the conflict between surplus sharing and incentive provision. For λ = 1/2,
the BoD puts equal weight on both parties’ shares so that the BoD essentially maximizes
the agent’s contribution to the joint surplus.27
3.2.2 Equilibrium board composition
I determine next the equilibrium composition of the BoD. At date 1 the CEO proposes a
BoD with a given dependence level λ and a contribution function y(λ). This proposal is
subject to shareholder approval at date 2. If the shareholders accept the CEO’s proposal,
their utility equals
E[UP (y(λ), a∗(λ))] = y(λ) +H(a∗(λ)) + xL − w (13)
27 In fact, [G(a) +H(a)]/2 = [a ·∆x − C(a)]/2 = Π(a)/2.
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The CEO’s proposal has two countervailing eﬀects on the utility of shareholders. As long
as y(λ) > 0, the shareholders’ utility is increasing in the BoD’s contribution to firm value.
Further, if the CEO composes the BoD so that ρ > 0, y(λ) is increasing in λ so that
shareholders partly benefit from an increasing level of board dependence. This positive eﬀect
is oﬀset by a reduction of the principals’ share in the surplus generated by the agent because
H(a) is monotonically decreasing in a for λ > 0. The optimal level of board dependence
from the principal’s perspective balances the two eﬀects and can be found by maximizing
(13) with respect to λ.
Lemma 2: Let λ∗ denote the optimal level of board dependence from the shareholders’
perspective. It holds that λ∗ < 1/2 if ρ < ρ+, where ρ+ > 0. Proof: see appendix.
Intuitively, lemma 2 requires that the BoD’s marginal contribution to firm value is not
always larger than the marginal loss resulting from the decline of the shareholders’ surplus
share generated by the agent’s eﬀort. In fact, if ρ > ρ+ there is no conflict of interest
between the CEO and the firm’s shareholders because both player prefer a dependence level
of λ = 1/2. To focus on non-trivial equilibria, the subsequent analysis considers the case
where ρ < ρ+ so that λ∗ < 1/2.
Since shareholders cannot control the optimal BoD composition, they are not interested
in implementing a BoD with a dependence level of λ∗. While the shareholders can control
the level of board dependence, they can only compose a BoD with an expected contribution
of zero. However, for y(λ), the shareholders’ best alternative consists of implementing an
independent BoD in order to maximize the agent’s contribution to firm value, H(a). In this
case, the shareholders’ utility equals E[UP (0, a
∗(0))] − k. A rational CEO anticipates the
shareholders’ decision problem and proposes a BoD so that it maximizes her utility and is
accepted by shareholders at date 2. The solution is summarized in Proposition 1:
Proposition 1: In the absence of SoP, the equilibrium composition of the BoD comprises
the first-best contribution function yFB(λ) and a strictly positive level of board dependence
λ = λN . If the board’s contribution is suﬃciently large,λN = λFB. Otherwise, the equilibrium
level of board dependence solves
yFB(λN) +H(a∗(λN)) = H(a∗(0))− k, (14)
the solution λN ∈ (0, 1/2) is unique. Proof: see appendix.
As in the first-best solution, the CEO proposes a BoD with a maximum contribution
function yFB(λ). This strategy is optimal because the CEO’s utility does not directly depend
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on the parameters of y(λ) but a higher board contribution prompts shareholders to approve
a higher dependence level. Since the CEO’s utility is monotonically increasing in λ, she
uses her ability to bundle the two essential director qualities in a manner that the firm’s
shareholders accept the highest possible level of board dependence.
The equilibrium level of board dependence is strictly positive. It holds that λN ≤ 1/2 be-
cause the principal must solve the trade-oﬀ between incentive provision and surplus sharing.
Since H(a∗(1/2)) = 0, it is only optimal for the principal to allow for the first-best level of
board dependence if the BoD’s contribution to firm profit is relatively more important than
the net contribution of the agent. Particularly, the shareholders approve the first-best level
of board dependence if and only if yFB(λFB) ≥ H(a∗(0))− k. That is, the net contribution
of a BoD with λ = 1/2 must not be lower than the diﬀerence between the surplus share
attainable with an independent board and the transaction cost, otherwise λN < 1/2. Ceteris
paribus, the shareholders are willing to accept a more dependent board, the higher the in-
tercept (v) and the slope (ρ) of the BoD’s contribution function. Likewise, the equilibrium
level of board dependence is decreasing in the benchmark contribution of an independent
board, H(a∗(0)), and increasing in the transaction cost (k).
4 Optimal contract and BoD composition with SoP
4.1 Optimal contract with SoP
In this section, I consider the consequences of an advisory shareholder vote on the agent’s
compensation. As shown in figure 1, the vote takes place between date 5 and date 6, after
the firm’s results are realized but before the compensation is paid out to the agent. Before
submitting their vote, shareholders observe the firm’s profit and the resulting compensation
and evaluate the prospective total compensation against the benchmark level t. As long as
s(x) ≤ t, the shareholders accept the BoD’s compensation proposal, otherwise they reject
it. Since t is uniformly distributed over the interval [s, s] with density φ(t) = 1/(s− s), the
fraction of shareholders refusing to approve a given compensation of s(x) equals
α(x) = Φ[s(x)] = φ(t) · [s(x)− s]. (15)
The expression in (15) reflects the well documented empirical observation that the share-
holder voting dissent is positively related to the level of CEO compensation. The higher the
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CEO’s compensation level, the higher the fraction of shareholders that disapprove the BoD’s
compensation policy.
The optimal voting strategy of shareholders depends on the realized result. According
to corollary 1, the level of board dependence does not aﬀect the agent’s salary so that the
firm sets w = w for all types of boards. The presence of SoP cannot alter this result
because a higher salary merely increases the likelihood of a shareholder disapproval without
providing any benefits to the BoD. It follows that α(xL) = 0 because s ≥ w regardless of
the firm’s result. Accordingly, shareholders can only have an incentive to disapprove the
agent’s compensation in case of a good result. They do so if w + b > t so that α(xH) =
φ(t) · (s(xH)− s) > 0. Considering the optimal voting strategy of shareholders, the expected
equilibrium level of voting dissent equals bα = a · α(xH).
Anticipating the shareholders’ equilibrium vote, the BoD maximizes its objective function
in (2) net of the disutility arising from a negative shareholder vote to determine the optimal
contract. Lemma 3 characterizes the equilibrium eﬀort induced by the optimal contract.
Lemma 3: The agent’s equilibrium eﬀort in the presence of SoP is implicitly given by the
following expression
a◦(λ) = (1− λ) · [(∆x − C
0(a)]− θ · α(xH)
(1− 2 · λ+ θ · φ(t)) · C 00(a) . (16)
For a given value of λ, it holds that a◦(λ) ≤ a∗(λ) and b◦(λ) ≤ b∗(λ). The inequalities are
strict whenever θ is positive. Proof: see appendix.
According to lemma 3, SoP prompts a BoD with a given dependence level λ to oﬀer the
agent a contract that provides lower eﬀort incentives. It does so by reducing the bonus,
whereas the equilibrium salary is not aﬀected by the shareholder vote and equal to w. That
is, with an identical salary and a lower bonus, advisory SoP can be expected to reduce the
total compensation granted by a BoD with a given dependence level λ.
Setting the CEO’s compensation requires the BoD to trade oﬀ its interest in balancing
the principal’s and the agent’s utilities against the disutility arising from the prospects of
a negative shareholder vote. Since the BoD’s utility is decreasing in α but α is increasing
in the agent’s compensation, the anticipation of a negative advisory vote leads the BoD
to reduce the agent’s compensation even though the vote is not directly enforceable. In
equilibrium, the downward adjustment of the bonus partly corrects for the positive impact
of board dependence on the agent’s compensation. The higher the BoD’s responsiveness to
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shareholder concerns (θ) and the equilibrium voting dissent in case of a good result, α(xH),
the lower is the bonus and the lower is the equilibrium eﬀort motivated by the optimal
contract.
The same eﬀect is induced by a higher value of the uniform density function φ(t). Fixing
the lower bound of the support at s, a higher value of the density function is equivalent to
a lower value of s, the highest acceptable compensation to shareholders. That is, a lower
tolerance of shareholders towards high compensation levels prompts the BoD to reduce the
agent’s pay. However, advisory SoP can only impact the compensation policy if the BoD
is actually responsive to shareholders’ concerns. If θ = 0, the compensation contract is the
same as without SoP even if the BoD anticipates a strictly positive voting dissent. Likewise,
it is essential for the eﬀectiveness of advisory SoP that some shareholders openly disagree
with the firm’s compensation policy even if doing so does not add to their utility once
the compensation contract has been signed. Only the interplay of a responsive BoD with
shareholders willing to evaluate the firm’s compensation levels against a benchmark, such
as the pay level of peer firms with similar performance, makes SoP an eﬀective governance
instrument despite the fact that it is not binding.
4.2 Equilibrium BoD composition with SoP
The equilibrium level of board dependence is determined as in section 3.2. At date 1, the
CEO anticipates the shareholders’ decision problem and proposes a board with the maximum
acceptable level of board dependence at date 2. The result is summarized in proposition 2:
Proposition 2: The equilibrium composition of the BoD with advisory SoP combines the
first-best contribution function yFB(λ) with a strictly positive level of board dependence λ =
λA. The equilibrium level of board dependence solves
yFB(λA) +H(a◦(λA)) = H(a∗(0))− k, (17)
whenever an interior solution λA ∈ (0, 1/2) exists. Otherwise, λA = 1/2. It holds that
λA ≥ λN . The inequality is strict whenever λN < 1/2. Proof: see appendix.
According to proposition 2, the presence of SoP does not aﬀect the shape of the BoD’s
contribution function, yFB(λ), but it leads to a weakly higher level of board dependence
as compared to the equilibrium level in the absence of SoP. Intuitively, λA ≥ λN because
shareholders attain a higher utility for a given value of λ so that they are willing to accept a
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higher level of board dependence before eventually replacing the BoD at date 2. Particularly,
since the contribution function is the same as in the absence of SoP, the marginal benefit of
board dependence is unaﬀected by its introduction. By contrast, the marginal cost of board
dependence is reduced because the BoD anticipates that a fraction of shareholders disagrees
with the CEO’s compensation and reduces the agent’s bonus for a given value of λ. This
direct eﬀect on the agent’s compensation increases the shareholders utility for a given level
of board dependence so that
E[UP (y(λ), a◦(λ))] > E[UP (y(λ), a∗(λ))] ∀ λ. (18)
Shareholders can only benefit from the reduction in compensation cost if the CEO proposes
the same level of board dependence as without SoP. However, since the utility derived from
the outside option of replacing the current BoD with a board that makes no contribution to
firm value, rational shareholders cannot credibly refuse to accept a more dependent board
than in the absence of SoP. A rational CEO anticipates the shareholders’ willingness to
accept a higher level of board dependence and proposes λA so that the shareholders are
indiﬀerent between approval and disapproval. Essentially, the constant outside option of
shareholders puts the CEO in the position of the residual claimant.
Thus, whenever (17) has an interior solution, λA > λN and shareholders attain the utility
level associated with their outside option, H(a∗(0))− k. Shareholders can only benefit from
SoP if the CEO is constrained in her ability to extract the surplus. For example, if λN = 1/2,
the CEO cannot further increase the level of board dependence so that λA = λN . It follows
directly from (18) that shareholders benefit from SoP under these conditions.28 Proposition
3 summarizes the impact of advisory SoP on the CEO’s compensation:
Proposition 3: Whenever (17) has an interior solution so that λA < 1/2, advisory SoP
increases the CEO’s compensation, that is a◦(λA) > a∗(λN), and b◦(λA) > b∗(λN). If λA =
1/2, the impact of SoP on the CEO’s compensation is ambiguous. Proof: see appendix.
If λN < λA < 1/2, the increased level of board dependence directly translates into a
higher eﬀort despite the fact that SoP reduces a◦(λ) < a∗(λ) for a given value of λ, so that
a◦(λA) > a∗(λN). That is, in equilibrium the diﬀerence between the two levels of board
dependence λA and λN outweighs the marginal reduction of the agent’s eﬀort level caused
28 The same holds if λN < 1/2 but λA = 1/2 because the CEO can extract the full surplus in the absence
of SoP but not with SoP.
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by SoP. To induce the increased equilibrium eﬀort, the firm must raise the agent’s bonus
so that the agent’s compensation is higher than without SoP. That is, whenever SoP has a
non-trivial impact on the firm’s board structure, it can be expected to increase the level of
executive compensation.
As for the utility of shareholders, advisory SoP only unambiguously increases the agent’s
compensation if the CEO is constrained in her ability to extract the surplus. If λA is not
determined by (17) but limited to its boundary value of λA = 1/2, the agent’s compensation
can also decrease. A clear prediction can be made for the case where λA = λN = 1/2.
For this case it follows directly from lemma 3 that a◦(λA) < a∗(λN) so that the agent’s
equilibrium eﬀort and the corresponding compensation are reduced by the introduction of
SoP. For intermediate cases, where λN is interior but λA is bounded, the impact of SoP on
the agent’s eﬀort and her compensation is ambiguous.
5 Extensions and regulatory implications
5.1 Binding SoP
As mentioned in the introduction, a number of European countries did not follow the Anglo-
Saxon approach of an advisory vote but have introduced a binding shareholder vote on the
remuneration of executives. In this section, I briefly discuss whether and how this change
of the SoP design aﬀects the predictions of my model. As in section 4, I assume that the
vote takes place after the firm’s results are realized and the size of the agent’s bonus has
been determined but before the agent’s compensation is paid out so that the time line of the
game in figure 1 remains unchanged.29
With a binding vote, the BoD can only pay out the prospective compensation to the
agent if the firm’s shareholders approve the payment, otherwise the agent’s compensation
needs to be adjusted. As a practical matter, this type of regulation requires that the BoD
closes all compensation contracts subject to later shareholder approval in order to avoid
the payment of damages in case of a negative shareholder vote. Otherwise, the CEO may
29 Apart from Switzerland, where a post-contractual binding vote is currently included in a law proposal
put forward in a public voting initiative, a binding vote on the actual remuneration amount is already
law in Czechia and in Latvia, see European Commission (2010).
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successfully sue the firm for the payment of her contractual claims.
To address these legal issues within my model framework, I subsequently assume that the
shareholders can eﬀectively refuse the payout of any compensation exceeding an exogenously
given amount of m, provided that the SoP proposal finds majority support. The amount m
defines the legal protection standard of the CEO. On the one hand it determines the extent to
which the SoP vote can overrule existing compensation arrangements, and on the other hand
it limits the amount of compensation that can be granted without shareholder approval. For
example, if m = w, all bonus payments are subject to prior shareholder approval, whereas if
m > w, the CEO is essentially in a position to enforce a part of her bonus awards by legal
action. To assure that the agent accepts the compensation contract at date 4, I subsequently
assume that m ≥ w.
The analysis of the players’ equilibrium strategies starts with the shareholders’ voting
decision between dates 5 and 6. Since the vote takes place after the agent has supplied
her eﬀort, the shareholders face a moral hazard problem. As before, shareholders compare
the prospective compensation with their individual benchmark pay level t and refuse it if
t < s(x). However, even shareholders that do not vote against the CEO’s compensation in
an advisory vote because t ≥ s(x), have an incentive to disapprove the BoD’ compensation
proposal whenever s(x) > m. If they approve the CEO’s compensation, they must pay
s(x). If they refuse it, they must only pay a compensation of m. It follows that rational
shareholders are strictly better oﬀ if they refuse any compensation exceeding m.
Since m ≥ w, the agent’s salary cannot be reduced so that a negative SoP vote can
only aﬀect the agent’s bonus in case of a good result (x = xH). Particularly, whenever
b > b := m−w, all shareholders vote against the agent’s compensation and force the BoD to
cut the bonus to b. Thus, the equilibrium voting dissent is α = 1 as long as the BoD proposes
a bonus exceeding b. Otherwise α(xL) = 0 and α(xH) = Φ[s(xH)] as with advisory SoP.
The consequences of the shareholder vote on the agent’s compensation and the equilibrium
composition of the BoD are summarized in Proposition 4
Proposition 4: With a binding SoP, the equilibrium composition of the BoD comprises the
first-best contribution function yFB(λ) and a board dependence level of λB. The equilibrium
degree of board dependence is determined by the legal protection standard of the CEO. If
m < s(xH) it holds that λB ∈ [0,λA) and the agent’s bonus equals b = m − w < b◦(λA). If
m ≥ s(xH) the enforceability of the SoP vote has no impact on the equilibrium strategies,
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i.e. λB = λA and b = b◦(λA). Proof: see appendix.
According to proposition 4, the enforceability of the shareholder vote on the SoP proposal
can only aﬀect the player’s equilibrium strategies if the legal protection standards are low.
Particularly, if shareholders can eﬀectively preclude any compensation payment abovem, the
shareholders can eﬀectively cut the agent’s bonus to b whenever s(x) > m, otherwise the BoD
implements the same contract as with advisory SoP. A rational board of directors anticipates
this threat and reduces the contractually specified bonus to b. This strategy is optimal for
the BoD because it minimizes the equilibrium voting dissent. As a consequence, the threat
of a retroactive bonus cut by the firm’s shareholders is never carried out in equilibrium.
Faced with a contractual bonus of b, the CEO reduces her level to a = C
0−1(b). This
eﬀort level is lower than a◦(λA), the equilibrium eﬀort with advisory SoP. Further, since b is
increasing in m, the agent’s eﬀort is increasing in the legal protection standard. The higher
(lower) the amount of the agent’s compensation that can be granted without shareholder
approval, the higher (lower) her equilibrium eﬀort. To assure that the BoD pays no bonus
below b, the CEO composes the BoD so that λB ≥ 0 and a◦(λB) = a. Both conditions,can
only be met if a > a◦(0), otherwise the shareholders disapprove the optimal bonus proposed
by an independent BoD. In this case, the CEO does not benefit from proposing a dependent
BoD and composes the board so that λB = 0. Shareholders accept the CEO’s board proposal
at date 2 because they attain a higher utility than in case of a rejection.
The analysis shows that a binding SoP can be more eﬀective than an advisory vote
for controlling the level of board dependence and thereby the CEO’s compensation. The
consequences of a binding SoP crucially depend on the legal protection standard of the CEO.
Ifm is high so that shareholders cannot impair existing contractual arrangement between the
BoD and the CEO, a binding SoP oﬀers no advantage over an advisory vote. For lower values
of m, a binding SoP becomes an eﬀective control mechanism for shareholders. However, this
mechanism can also become too rigid and impair the agent’s eﬀort incentives. In the worst
case, when m = w, the agent exerts no eﬀort because the perspective of a retroactive bonus
cut prompts the BoD to remove any bonus payment from the agent’s compensation contract.
5.2 Pre-contractual SoP
The moral hazard problem caused by a binding SoP can basically be avoided if the vote
on the compensation takes place before the BoD signs the compensation contract with the
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agent.30 This simple change of the decision sequence avoids that shareholders are tempted
to adjust the agent’s prospective compensation after she has taken her eﬀort decision and
thereby secures the agent’s contractual claims. Subsequently, I briefly discuss the impact
of this change in the order of moves on the equilibrium of the SoP game. The sequence of
events for a pre-contractual vote is given in figure 2.
[please insert figure 2 about here]
Diﬀerent from the previous analysis, the firm’s shareholders vote on the BoD’s contract
proposal immediately after date 3 but before the agent receives the final contract oﬀer. Based
on the voting outcome, the BoD decides on the revision of the contract oﬀer and proposes a
potentially revised compensation contract to the CEO. As before, the vote can be advisory
or binding. Provided that shareholders can only accept or reject the BoD’s compensation
proposal but not determine the details of the contract, it is necessary to define the BoD’
fallback position for a shareholder disapproval in a binding vote.31 To keep the analysis
simple, I assume that the BoD revises the contract in a manner that the agent receives only
her salary but no bonus whenever the vote is binding and the majority of shareholders rejects
the initial contract proposal.
Since the agent’s eﬀort choice for a given bonus contract is not aﬀected by the pre-
contractual SoP vote, it suﬃces to begin the analysis with the shareholders’ voting decision
after date 3. Suppose that the BoD proposes a contract specifying a salary of w and an
arbitrary bonus b to the firm’s shareholders. Diﬀerent from a post-contractual SoP, share-
holders must vote on the contract oﬀer before they know the firm’s result and the agent’s
final compensation. The most natural way to deal with this informational disadvantage is
to evaluate the agent’s expected compensation against the benchmark level t. Following this
approach, shareholders disapprove the contract proposal whenever E[s(x)] > t so that the
equilibrium voting dissent equals α = Φ(E[s(x)]).
Given that the vote is pre-contractual, the shareholders’ optimal voting strategy is in-
dependent of whether or not the SoP is binding. Diﬀerent from a post-contractual vote,
30 In fact, some European countries such as the Netherlands or Sweden have recently adopted a pre-
contractual binding SoP, see European Commission (2010) for details.
31 Clearly, if shareholders were allowed to make their own bonus proposals, they could force the BoD to set
the bonus that maximizes their utility. However, assuming that shareholders are able to determine the
details of the CEO’s compensation contract would lead the idea of SoP to the point of absurdity.
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shareholders for which t > E[s(x)] do not have an incentive to remove the agent’s bonus
from the compensation contract even if they are in a position to enforce such a drastic con-
tract adjustment. The reason is that a bonus of b = 0 eliminates the agent’s eﬀort incentives
and therefore her contribution to firm value.32 Thus, even if shareholders possess significant
veto power, they must not necessarily have an incentive to execute it.
If the pre-contractual vote is advisory, the BoD is not forced to alter the compensation
contract after a negative shareholder vote but it anticipates the shareholders’ voting dissent
and considers it in its compensation decision. Proposition 5 compares the resulting equi-
librium eﬀorts and bonus payments with those attainable under a post-contractual voting
regime.
Proposition 5: Let a+(λ) denote the equilibrium eﬀort level and b+(λ) the bonus with a pre-
contractual advisory vote. It holds that a+(λ) ≤ a◦(λ) and b+(λ) ≤ b◦(λ). The inequalities
are strict whenever s > w and θ is positive. Proof: see appendix.
According to proposition 5, a BoD with a given dependence level implements a lower
equilibrium eﬀort and grants a lower bonus to the agent. It does so because a pre-contractual
advisory vote increases the marginal voting dissent and thereby the BoD’s disutility arising
from a negative shareholder vote.33 As already argued in section 4 the bonus reduction
induced by an advisory SoP increases the shareholders’ utility for a given level of board
dependence. Because shareholders do not control the BoD’s contribution to firm value, they
face the same outside option as with a post-contractual SoP. As a matter of fact, the CEO
can extract the additional surplus generated by the pre-contractual vote and implement a
higher level of board dependence as with a post-contractual SoP. Corollary 2 summarizes
the result.
32 Suppose that the BoD proposes a contract implementing an equilibrium eﬀort of a0 < a∗(1/2) so that
α < 1/2 if only shareholders for which E[s(x)] > t reject the contract. If the contract is implemented,
the shareholders’ utility equals E[UP (y, a
0)] = y+H(a0) + xL −w. If all shareholders refuse the contract
proposal and the BoD cuts the bonus to b = 0, the shareholders’ utility equals E[Up(y, 0)] = y + xL −w
so that shareholders suﬀer a loss of H(a0) > 0.
33 In fact, for a given contract with a salary of w and an arbitary bonus b, the shareholder voting dissent
aniticipated by the BoD at date 3 equals bα◦ = a · φ(t) · [w + b − s] for a post-contractual vote andbα+ = φ(t) · [w + a · b − s] for a pre-contractual vote. The diﬀerence in the shareholder voting dissent isbα+− bα◦ = (1−a) ·φ(t) · (w− s). Since s ≥ w, this expression is weakly increasing in a and makes a lower
eﬀort desirable for the BoD.
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Corollary 2: Let λA+denote the equilibrium level of board dependence with a pre-contractual
advisory SoP. It holds that λA+ ≥ λA. The inequality is strict whenever a+(λ) < a◦(λ) and
λA < 1/2. Proof: follows analogously from the proof of proposition 2.
Suppose now that the pre-contractual vote is binding. As long as the majority of share-
holders supports the BoD’s contract proposal, there is no need to adjust the contract after
the shareholder vote. As a consequence, the BoD implements the same contract as with an
advisory vote and the CEO establishes a BoD with a dependence level of λA+ as defined
in corollary 2. Whenever the initial contract proposal is not supported by the majority of
shareholders, the BoD must implement the fallback alternative. A rational board of directors
anticipates this scenario and designs the initial contract so that the proposal finds majority
support.
Corollary 3: Let λB+denote the equilibrium level of board dependence with a pre-contractual
binding SoP. It holds that λB+ ≤ λA+. The inequality is strict whenever b+(λA+) > b+, where
b+(λA+) is the equilibrium bonus with advisiory SoP and b+ is the bonus that implements
an equilibrium eﬀort a+ so that a+ · C 0(a+) = E[t] − w. It holds that a+ > 0. Proof: see
appendix
Pursuant to corollary 3, a binding SoP imposes weakly tighter limits on board dependence
than an advisory vote so that the shareholder control over the agent’s compensation becomes
more eﬀective. Whenever the threat of rejecting the initial contract proposal after date 3
imposes tighter limits on the agent’s bonus than the threat of replacing the BoD at date 2,
the equilibrium level of board dependence with a binding SoP is strictly lower than with an
advisory SoP. That is, a binding vote can only be more eﬀective if the majority of shareholders
fails to support the optimal contract implemented with an advisory vote. Otherwise, both
voting regimes yield equivalent board structures.
5.3 Regulatory implications
The analysis in section 4 shows that SoP can have a significant impact on the level of
executive compensation and on the equilibrium composition of the BoD. In addition, the
analysis of the model extensions in sections 5.1 and 5.2 suggests that an appropriate SoP
design can be important for its eﬀectiveness, especially as it concerns the enforceability
and the timing of the shareholder vote. A rational regulatory authority must consider
these consequences and adopt measures that satisfy the objectives of the regulation. The
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natural purpose of SoP is to improve shareholder rights in order to maximize the expected
shareholder value. In the context of the model, this objective is equivalent to maximizing
the principal’s expected utility. Proposition 6 asserts how the basic advisory SoP complies
with this objective.
Proposition 6: Shareholders weakly benefit form an advisory SoP. Whenever λA < 1/2,
shareholders attain the same utility level as in the absence of SoP. They are strictly better
oﬀ if SoP cannot aﬀect the equilibrium level of board dependence, that is if λA = λN = 1/2.
Proof: see appendix.
According to proposition 6, advisory SoP leaves the utility of shareholders largely unaf-
fected. As shown in section 4, an advisory vote lowers the compensation cost for a given level
of board dependence because the BoD derives a disutility from a negative shareholder vote
and adjusts the agent’s compensation accordingly. Since the CEO has the real authority
over the composition of the board, she can extract the rent generated by the improved com-
pensation policy and establish a more dependent BoD. As long as there are no restrictions
on the level of board dependence, the CEO implements a board with a dependence level of
λA < 1/2 and captures the full surplus in form of a higher compensation.
Shareholders can only benefit from the advisory vote if the CEO is restricted in her
ability to extract the surplus. Particularly, whenever λN = 1/2, so that the level of board
dependence can not be adjusted, the shareholders unambiguously benefit from an advisory
vote on the CEO’s compensation. It follows that an advisory shareholder vote can only be
beneficial for firms with extreme levels of board dependence. As an alternative, the regulator
might consider the introduction of a binding shareholder vote. Proposition 7 summarizes
the potential consequences of this measure.
Proposition 7: The consequences of a stricter enforceability of the SoP depend on the legal
protection standards of the CEO. If m > m, shareholders attain the same utility level as with
an advisory SoP. If SoP becomes binding, the shareholders’ utility is increasing whenever
m < m < m and decreasing if m < m. Proof: see appendix.
As already argued in section 5.1, the consequences of a binding SoP critically depend on
the legal protection standard of the CEO. Since the vote is post-contractual and binding, the
shareholders face a moral hazard problem because the SoP design allows them to refuse the
payment of the bonus after the CEO has spent her personal eﬀort for the firm. A rational
CEO anticipates this problem and adjusts her eﬀort accordingly. The protection standard
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m defines to what extent the shareholder vote can actually reverse existing compensation
arrangements and thereby limits the consequences of the moral hazard problem. If m > m,
there is no moral hazard problem because the shareholders are not in a position to refuse
the compensation granted by the BoD under an advisory voting regime.
By contrast, if m < m the shareholders can at least partly refuse the payment of the
CEO’s bonus. This threat eﬀectively limits the CEO’s compensation to a bonus of b := m−w
and thereby prompts the CEO to limit the level of board dependence to λB. Since λB < λA
and λA is larger than λ∗, the optimal level of board dependence from the shareholders’
perspective, the firm’s shareholders are strictly better of if SoP becomes binding, provided
the protection standard is not too low. Particularly, whenever m < m, the consequences of
the moral hazard problem are so severe that the shareholders’ utility is lower than with an
advisory vote.
In extreme cases where the legal protection standard is so low that the shareholders can
refuse any bonus payment ex post (m = w), a binding SoP completely destroys the agent’s
eﬀort incentives. Because the principal cannot credibly commit to refrain from a retroactive
pay cut, the binding SoP not only reduces the agent’s compensation but also minimizes her
contribution to firm profit. Moreover, because the CEO does not benefit from establishing a
dependent BoD, the BoD’s contribution is reduced to v. These results show that a binding
CEO is a double-edged sword that should only be used if the legal environment provides
suﬃcient protection against the moral hazard problem on the part of shareholders. One way
to avoid this problem is a change in the order of moves so that the vote takes place before
the agent signs the contract. Corollary 4 summarizes the consequences of a pre-contractual
vote.
Corollary 4: The consequences of a pre-contractual SoP depend on its enforceability.
A) If SoP is advisory, shareholders (weakly) benefit relative to a post-contractual vote if
λA+ = λA = 1/2. If λA+ < 1/2, both alternatives yield identical utility levels.
B) The expected compensation with an advisory vote equals E[sA+]. A binding vote can only
aﬀect the utility of shareholder if E[sA+] > E[t]. If this condition is met, there exists a range
of equilibrium eﬀort levels a+ for which shareholders attain a strictly higher utility with a
binding vote.
If the precontractual vote is advisory, the change of the timing has not much impact on
the utility of shareholders. As before, they can only benefit if the CEO is restricted in her
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ability to adjust the level of board dependence. Whenever λA = 1/2 so that the CEO cannot
increase λ, the shareholders’ utility (weakly) increases because a pre-contractual vote invokes
a (weakly) higher level of board dependence. As shown in proposition 5, the voting dissent
is higher with a pre-contractual vote whenever s > w. Thus, if all shareholders accept at
least a small but positive bonus payment, the firm pays less compensation for the same level
of board dependence and implements an eﬀort level that is closer to the eﬀort level that
maximizes the agents’ contribution to firm profit without reducing the board’s contribution
to firm value.
If the precontractual vote is binding, shareholders can attain a higher utility whenever the
compensation paid with an advisory vote is not supported by the majority of shareholders.
In this case, the BoD adjusts the bonus so that a majority of shareholders accepts the
compensation proposal. The CEO anticipates the pay cut and limits the level of board
dependence to λB+ at date 1. As with a post-contractual vote the firm’s shareholders benefit
from this step because λB+ < λA+ and λA+ is larger than λ∗. However, since the vote takes
place before the contract is signed, this limitation does not arise from a moral hazard problem
but from the requirement to find the shareholders’ majority support for the SoP proposal.
Since it is always possible to propose a contract with a strictly positive bonus payment that
is accepted by a majority of shareholders, the CEO’s eﬀort incentives are only reduced but
cannot be completely destroyed with a pre-contractual vote. If the agent’s incentives are not
reduced too much, shareholders unambiguously benefit from a pre-contractual binding SoP.
The shareholders’ utility can only be negatively aﬀected if the expected value of the
benchmark pay level t is relatively low so that the average shareholder accepts only small
bonus payments. Though theoretically possible without imposing further restrictions on s,
this scenario is not very realistic because it requires that a majority of shareholders refuses
a compensation policy that strictly increases their utility. For realistic scenarios, a pre-
contractual binding can therefore be expected to contribute to shareholder value.
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6 Summary and conclusions
In this paper I examine the impact of SoP on the compensation decisions and the structure
of the board of directors. I propose a three-layer agency model with a CEO, a BoD, and the
firm’s shareholders. Although all parties are risk neutral an agency problem arises because
the CEO is protected by limited liability. Since SoP can only provide room for improvement
if there are ineﬃciencies in the pay-setting process, I consider a firm in which the CEO
has the real authority over the BoD. Since the BoD is responsible for designing the agent’s
compensation contract, the CEO’s power over the BoD allows her to influence her own pay.
The composition of the board of directors is determined as the equilibrium of a multi-
stage game. At the first stage of the game the CEO proposes a director slate that must
be approved by the firm’s shareholders at stage two. The board members diﬀer in their
ability to contribute to firm value and their dependence from the CEO. The dependence
level of each candidate is common knowledge but only the CEO can evaluate the potential
contributions of individual board members. This informational advantage allows the CEO
to combine the two qualities of board members in a manner that makes a dependent BoD
attractive to shareholders. Since shareholders cannot evaluate the contribution of individual
board members, they are unable to establish an eﬃcient board structure. As an outside
alternative they can refuse the CEO’s director slate and replace it with an independent BoD
that provides an expected contribution of zero.
The key variable in the model is the level of board dependence. The CEO is interested
in a more dependent BoD because it oﬀers her a higher bonus for a given firm performance.
To obtain the shareholder approval for a dependent BoD, the CEO composes the BoD so
that its contribution to firm value is positively related to the level of board dependence.
Shareholders solve the resulting trade-oﬀ between an increasing contribution to firm value
and higher compensation cost by accepting a dependent board. The equilibrium level of
board dependence is determined by the point where shareholders attain the same utility as
with their outside option.
Under these conditions, the introduction of a shareholder vote on the CEO’s compen-
sation has a direct and an indirect consequence. The direct eﬀect prompts a BoD with a
given dependence level to reduce the CEO’s bonus for a given firm performance. A BoD
with a given structure cuts the CEO’s bonus because the board members derive a disutility
from a negative shareholder vote and because they anticipate that the voting dissent is in-
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creasing in the agent’s compensation. However, since the CEO has the real authority over
the composition of the BoD and the shareholders face the same outside option, the CEO
can extract the rent generated by the improved compensation policy and establish a more
dependent BoD. As an indirect consequence of SoP the board becomes more dependent from
the CEO and pays her a higher compensation for the same level of performance. As a matter
of fact, SoP reduces the eﬃciency of the CEO’s compensation contract and aggravates the
firm’s governance problem. This outcome can only be avoided if the CEO is restricted in
her ability to adjust the board composition.
Motivated by existing international diﬀerences in SoP design, I also analyze the conse-
quences of a binding SoP and the impact of a pre-contractual vote. I first maintain the
timing of the standard SoP model and demonstrate that a binding vote creates a moral haz-
ard problem on the part of the firm’s shareholders. In fact, since the vote takes place after
the agent has supplied her eﬀort, shareholders have an incentive to expropriate the CEO
by refusing the payment of the bonus. A rational CEO anticipates this threat and reduces
her eﬀort accordingly. The consequences of the moral hazard problem critically depend on
the legal protection standard of the CEO. If existing contractual arrangements between the
BoD and the CEO cannot be overruled by the SoP vote, a binding SoP yields the same
outcome as an advisory vote. If the shareholders can only enforce small bonus cuts, a bind-
ing SoP can even improve the eﬃciency of the compensation contract and limit the level of
board dependence. In the worst case, where all bonus payments must be approved by the
firm’s shareholders, the threat of a retroactive pay cut completely destroys the agent’s eﬀort
incentives and thereby diminishes shareholder value.
A pre-contractual vote can avoid the moral hazard problem because the vote on the
compensation takes place before the agent supplies her eﬀort. If the pre-contractual vote
is binding, shareholders can force the BoD to improve the eﬃciency of the compensation
arrangement and eﬀectively reduce the equilibrium level of board dependence. However,
these eﬀects are not caused by a moral hazard problem but by the requirement to find the
shareholders’ majority support for the SoP proposal. If the pre-contractual vote is advisory,
the change of the timing has only little impact on the equilibrium of the game except for a
weakly higher voting dissent.
Overall, my findings suggest that a shareholder vote on the remuneration of executives
as well as its enforceability and its timing can have a significant impact on the equilibrium
degree of board dependence, the level of executive compensation, and on the utilities of the
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players. The standard approach of an advisory SoP usually leaves the shareholders’ utility
unaﬀected and can only add to shareholder value if the CEO is restricted in her ability to
adjust the board structure. The impact of a post-contractual binding SoP critically depends
on the legal protection standard of the CEO. I identify conditions under which shareholders
strictly benefit from a binding SoP but there is also a minimum protection standard below
which a binding SoP diminishes firm value. Since the critical values determining the eﬃcacy
of the legal standard are firm specific, it is hardly possible for a regulator to release legal
protections that unambiguously benefit all firms with weak governance structures. This
problem does not apply to a pre-contractual vote but it is not guaranteed that shareholders
strictly benefit from such a step. If the vote is binding, shareholders attain a higher utility
whenever the compensation paid with an advisory vote is not supported by the majority of
shareholders. If the vote is advisory, the shareholders typically attain the same utility as
with a post-contractual SoP.
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Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1
For a given value of λ, the BoD maximizes
E[VB] = (1− λ) · (y(λ) + xL + a ·∆x)− λ · C(a)− (1− 2λ) · (w + a · b) (19)
subject to the limited liability constraint in (8), the participation constraint in (7) and the
incentive constraint in (9).
I first show that the participation constraint is not binding. Substituting for b from the
incentive constraint into the participation constraint yields
w + a · C 0(a)− C(a) ≥ 0 (20)
Since C(a) is strictly convex, G(a) = a·C 0(a)−C(a) is positive and monotonically increasing
in a, i.e. G0(a) = a · C 00(a) > 0. Thus, it must be that w < 0 if the participation constraint
should be binding. However, a negative salary violates the limited liability constraint, a
contradiction. It follows that (8) must be binding and that the optimal salary equals w∗ = w.
Substituting for b and w from (8) and (9) into (19) and rearranging terms yields the first
order condition
∂E[VB]/∂a = (1− λ) · [∆x − C 0(a)]− (1− 2λ) · a · C 00(a) = 0, (21)
solving for a yields the expression in (10). Since h(λ) = (1 − λ)/(1 − 2λ) ≥ 1 and h(λ) is
monotonically increasing in λ, a∗(λ) = h(λ)·[(∆x−C 0(a))/C 00(a)] is monotonically increasing
in λ. For λ = 1/2, the ratio h(λ) is not defined but (21) becomes
∂E[VB]/∂a = 1
2
· [∆x − C 0(a)] = 0. (22)
This condition is only satisfied by the first-best eﬀort level in (6)
Proof of Lemma 2
Since H(a) is strictly concave and monotonically decreasing in a for λ > 0, (13) has a unique
maximum implicitly defined by the first order condition
∂E[UP (y(λ), a∗(λ))]
∂λ = ρ+H
0(a∗(λ)) · da
∗(λ)
dλ ≥ 0. (23)
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Since H 0(a∗(λ)) < 0 for λ > 0 and a∗(λ) is monotonically increasing in lambda, the second
term in (23) is negative, it follows that λ∗ > 0 whenever ρ > 0. An interior solution is
obtained if ∂E[UP (y(1/2), a∗(1/2))]
∂λ < 0, (24)
otherwise λ = 1/2. Since (23) is monotonically increasing in ρ, there exists a critical value
ρ = ρ+ for which (24) holds with equality. Since ρ ≤ ρ, it follows that λ∗ < 1/2 whenever
ρ+ < ρ.
Proof of Proposition 1
At date 1 the CEO composes a BoD with a dependence level λ and a contribution y(λ) and
proposes it to the firm’s shareholders. If the shareholders accept the proposal at date 2,
their utility equals
E[UP (y(λ), a∗(λ))] = y(λ) + xL − w +H(a∗(λ)) (25)
if they refuse the proposal, their net utility after transaction cost equals
E[UP (0, a
∗(0))]− k = xL − w +H(a∗(0))− k. (26)
It follows that the shareholders accept the CEO’s proposal whenever
y(λ) +H(a∗(λ)) ≥ H(a∗(0))− k. (27)
To determine the optimal board composition, the CEO maximizes her expected utility sub-
ject to the shareholders’ participation constraint (27). Substituting from (10), (12), and (11)
into the agents’s utility function (1) yields an equilibrium utility of:
E[U∗A] = w +G(a∗(λ)) (28)
Since G(a) is monotonically increasing in a and a is increasing in λ from lemma 1, the
expression in (28) is monotonically increasing λ. That is, the agent implements the maximum
level of board dependence satisfying (27).
The parameters of the board’s contribution function do not directly aﬀect the agent’s
utility but a positive contribution relaxes the shareholders’ participating constraint. The
higher y(λ), the larger the left hand side of (27). It follows that the CEO composes the
BoD so that v = v and ρ = ρ. As in the first-best case, the contribution function becomes
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yFB(λ) = v + ρ · λ. Using the fact that H(a∗(1/2)) = 0 and evaluating the shareholders’
participation constraint in (27) shows that the optimal solution falls into two cases:
Case 1: If yFB(λFB) ≥ H(a∗(0))− k, λN = 1/2.
Case 2: If yFB(λFB) < H(a∗(0))− k, λN ∈ (0, 1/2).
In the second case, the equilibrium level of board dependence is found by solving (14) for
λ. Since the left hand side of (14) is strictly concave in λ and yFB(0) > 0, the solution is
unique.
Proof of Lemma 3
With SoP the BoD considers the disutility arising from a negative shareholder vote and
maximizes
Z = E[VB]−E[DB], (29)
where E[DB] = θ · bα and bα = a ·α(xH) = a ·φ(t) · [w+b−s]. Maximizing Z under the limited
liability constraint in (8), the participation constraint in (7) and the incentive constraint in
(9) yields the following first order condition
∂Z/∂a = ∂E[VB]/∂a− θ · φ(t) · [a · C 00(a) + C 0(a) + w − s] = 0, (30)
where ∂E[VB]/∂a is given by (21). Using the fact that α(xH) = φ(t) · [w + C 0(a) − s]
and solving for a yields the expression in (16). Let λ denote an arbitrary level of board
dependence and a∗(λ) the optimal eﬀort level in the absence of SoP, it holds that
∂Z/∂a|a=a∗(λ) = −θ · φ(t) · [a · C 00(a) + C 0(a) + w − s] < 0. (31)
The expression must be positive because it must hold that w + C 0(a) > s. Otherwise, all
shareholders would support the optimal contract oﬀered by the dependent BoD. This is
a contradiction to the initial condition that bα > 0. It follows that a◦(λ) ≤ a∗(λ). The
inequality is strict whenever θ is positive.
Proof of Proposition 2
At date 1 the CEO proposes a BoD with a dependence level λ and a contribution function
yFB(λ) to shareholders. As in the absence of SoP shareholders compare the expected utility
arising from the CEO’s proposal with the expected utility derived from a (potentially less
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dependent) replacement alternative that provides no contribution to firm value. Considering
the transaction cost, the outside alternative provides a utility of
H(a◦(λ))− k (32)
However, since H(a) is strictly concave and maximized by a = a∗(0) > a◦(0) it cannot
be optimal for the firm’s shareholders to implement an independent BoD as an outside
alternative. In fact, maximizing (34) requires to set λ0 > 0 so that a◦(λ0) = a∗(0). It follows
that
H(a◦(λ0))− k = H(a∗(λ))− k, (33)
that is, the shareholders’ outside option yields the same utility as in the absence of SoP.
Using this result the shareholders’ participation constraint can be written as
yFB(λ) +H(a◦(λ)) ≥ H(a∗(0))− k, (34)
where a◦(λ) denotes the agent’s equilibrium eﬀort for a given level of board dependence
as defined in (16). The condition in (34) is identical to (27) except for the fact that the
equilibrium eﬀort on the left hand side of (34) is a◦(λ) and not a∗(λ). As in the absence of
SoP, the optimal solution falls into two cases:
case 1: If yFB(λFB) +H(a◦(λFB)) ≥ H(a∗(0))− k, λA = 1/2.
case 2: If yFB(λFB) +H(a◦(λFB)) < H(a∗(0))− k, λA ∈ (0, 1/2).
In the second case, the equilibrium level of board dependence is found by solving (17) for λ.
To verify that λN ≤ λA, I consider first an arbitrary interior solution λN < 1/2,λA < 1/2
so that (14) and (17) are satisfied in equilibrium and it must hold that
yFB(λN) +H(a∗(λN)) = yFB(λA) +H(a◦(λA)). (35)
Assume now that λA = λN so that a◦(λN) ≤ a∗(λN) from Lemma 3. Since H(a) is monoton-
ically decreasing in a for a > a∗(0) it must hold that H(a◦(λN)) > H(a∗(λN)) so that the
right hand side of equation (35) is larger than the left hand side. It follows that the CEO
can increase λA up to the point where equation (35) holds with equality.
I consider next a boundary solution for λA : Let yFB(λFB)+H(a◦(λFB)) = H(a∗(0))−k
so that λA = 1/2. Since H(a◦(λFB)) > 0, the boundary condition implies that yFB(λFB) <
H(a∗(0))− k so that λN < 1/2. It follows that 1/2 ≥ λA > λN as long as λN < 1/2.
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Proof of Proposition 3
Let (14) and (17) hold so that λN < λA < 1/2. To rank the resulting equilibrium eﬀorts
under both regimes fix λN and suppose that the shareholders accept board proposals up
to λA > λN so that a◦(λA) = a∗(λN) and H(a◦(λA)) = H(a∗(λN)). With this policy (35)
becomes
yFB(λN) < yFB(λA) (36)
so that the firm must further increase λA to satisfy (35). It follows that in equilibrium
H(a◦(λA)) < H(a∗(λN)) and since H 0(a) < 0 for a > a∗(0) it must hold that a◦(λA) >
a∗(λN). Moreover, since λA > λN and a◦(λA) > a∗(λN) the incentive constraint in (9)
implies that b◦(λA) > b∗(λN).
Now let λN = λA = 1/2. It follows directly from lemma 3 that a◦(λA) < a∗(λN) from (9)
that b◦(λA) < b∗(λN) so that the agent’s total compensation is reduced. Given the opposite
consequences of the two extreme cases it must be that for λN < 1/2 and λA = 1/2 the
agent’s compensation and her equilibrium eﬀort can increase or decrease depending on the
diﬀerence between λNand λA.
Proof of Proposition 4
The equilibrium voting strategy of shareholders depends on the amount of the agent’s com-
pensation, s(x), relative to the size of the legally enforceable compensation level m. There
are two solutions.
Case 1: If s(xH) > m, α(xH) = 1.
Case 2: If s(xH) ≤ m,α(xH) = Φ[s(xH)], as in the case of an advisory vote.
Consider first case 2. Since the shareholders’ cannot force the BoD to cut the agent’s
compensation below m, shareholders cannot alter the compensation contract even if the
majority rejects the SoP proposal, i.e. Φ[s(xH)] > 1/2. It follows that the optimal compen-
sation contract and the equilibrium composition of the BoD are the same as with advisory
SoP.
Consider next case 1. Here, the BoD is forced to cut the agent’s compensation to b =
m−w ex post. A rational CEO anticipates the pay cut and reduces her optimal eﬀort level
to a = C
0−1(b). That is, regardless of whether or not the BoD proposes a bonus b > b at date
3, the agent will not provide more eﬀort than a = a because she anticipates the consequences
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of the binding SoP vote. Accordingly, the BoD’s expected utility at the contracting stage
equals
E[VB −DB|a = a] = E[VB(a, b, w)]− θ · bα, (37)
where E[VB(a, b, w)] is given in (19) and bα is the anticipated voting dissent. Since the
first term of the BoD’s objective function is constant but the second term is monotonically
decreasing in bα, the BoD has a strict incentive to minimize the anticipated voting dissent.
It does so by proposing a bonus of b in the first place because this pay level induces an
equilibrium voting dissent of Φ[w + b] < 1 instead of a voting dissent of α(xH) = 1 if b > b.
At date 1, the CEO composes the BoD in order to maximize her utility, w + G(a). As
before, she proposes a BoD with a dependence level λ to maximize G(a) and the first-best
contribution function yFB(λ) to meet the shareholders’ participation constraint. Anticipat-
ing that the bonus cannot exceed b, the agent realizes that her equilibrium eﬀort will not
be larger than a. Therefore, the CEO must simply assure that the BoD does not aim to
implement an equilibrium eﬀort lower than a.
As long as a > a◦(0), the CEO proposes a BoD with a positive dependence level λB so
that a◦(λB) = a.34 It must be that λB < λA because otherwise b◦(λA) < b, or equivalently,
s(x) ≤ m, a contradiction. If a ≤ a◦(0) and b ≤ b◦(0) so that the shareholders even
disapprove the optimal bonus proposed by an independent BoD, the CEO does not benefit
from a dependent BoD and proposes a BoD with a dependence level of λB = 0.
Since λB < λA, shareholders accept the CEO’s board proposal at date 2. In fact, following
the same arguments as in the proof of proposition 2, it must hold that any solution λA >
λB ≥ 0 satisfies the shareholders’ participation constraint in (34). However, if a < a◦(0),
the shareholders’ participation constraint becomes
yFB(0) +H(a) ≥ H(a)− k, (38)
where the expression on the right hand side of (38) reflects the fact that rational shareholders
must adopt the same voting strategy for the SoP proposal after date 5 regardless of whether
or not they approve the BoD at date 2.
34 Note that for 0 ≤ λ ≤ λB the BoD faces identical objective functions with a binding and an advisory SoP
because for λ ≤ λB it holds that s(x) ≤ m. Therefore a◦(λ) is the optimal eﬀort level with both forms of
SoP as long as 0 ≤ λ ≤ λB .
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Proof of Proposition 5
The proof is similar to the proof of lemma 3. The BoD maximizes its objective function Z
in (29) considering the limited liability constraint in (8), the participation constraint in (7)
the incentive constraint in (9), and the disutility arising from the anticipated voting dissent,bα = φ(t) · [w + a · b− s]. The first order condition for this problem is
∂Z/∂a = ∂E[VB]/∂a− θ · φ(t) · [a · C 00(a) + C 0(a)] = 0, (39)
where ∂E[VB]/∂a is given in (21). Evaluating the first order condition at the optimal eﬀort
level with a post-contractual advisory SoP in (16) yields
∂Z/∂a|a=a◦(λ) = θ · φ(t) · [w − s] ≤ 0 (40)
Because s ≥ w, it must be that a+(λ) ≤ a◦(λ). The inequality is strict whenever s > w and
θ is positive.
Proof of Corollary 3
Suppose that the BoD proposes a contract specifying the minimum salary w and an
arbitrary bonus b at date 3. After date 3 but before the final contract is signed and the
agent’s takes her eﬀort decision, the shareholders evaluate the expected compensation against
the benchmark t. Since only the fraction of voters for which E[s(x)] > t rejects the contract
proposal, the equilibrium voting dissent equals α = φ(t) · [w+ a · b− s]. As long as 0 < α ≤
1/2, the BoD considers the disutility arising from the shareholder vote in its compensation
decision and sets b = b+(λ) to implement an eﬀort of a = a+(λ) as defined in proposition
5. At date 1 the CEO proposes a dependence level of λA+ as defined in corollary 2. The
solution is equivalent to the equilibrium with a pre-contractual advisory SoP.
Suppose now that φ(t) · [w + a+(λA+) · b+(λA+) − s] > 1/2 so that the majority of
shareholders rejects the contract proposal of the board. Since the BoD cannot enforce a
contract that does not find majority support and a rejection of the bonus would reduce the
BoD’s utility, it anticipates the shareholder vote and proposes a contract so that α ≤ 1/2.
Considering the agent’s incentive constraint (9) and rearranging this inequality results in
the following constraint on the agent’s equilibrium eﬀort:
a · C 0(a) ≤ E[t]− w, (41)
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where E[t] is the expected value of the benchmark pay. That is, all contracts implement-
ing an equilibrium eﬀort so that (41) is satisfied are (weakly) supported by the majority
of shareholders. The equilibrium eﬀort a+ solves (41) with equality and b+ is the bonus
implementing a+. Since E[t] > w, it must be that a+ > 0.
Following the same arguments given in the proof of Proposition 4, it can be shown that
CEO proposes a BoD with a dependence level λB+ ≤ λA+ so that a◦(λB+) = a+. As long as
a+ > a◦(0), λB+ is positive, otherwise λB+ = 0. At date 2, shareholders accept the CEO’s
director slate (see the proof of proposition 4 for details).
Proof of Proposition 6
For a given level of board dependence and a given eﬀort level of the agent, the shareholders’
utility equals
E[UP (y(λ), a)] = y(λ) +H(a) + xL − w. (42)
From (14) and (17) it holds in equilibrium that
E[UP (y
FB(λN), a∗(λN))] = E[UP (yFB(λA), a◦(λA))] = H(a∗(0))− k, (43)
for λN < λA < 1/2, so that the shareholders receive the same expected utility with and
without an advisory SoP. If yFB(λFB) + H(a∗(λFB)) > H(a∗(0)) − k, so that λA = λN =
λFB = 1/2, the CEO cannot extract the full surplus and it holds that
E[UP (y
FB(λFB), a◦(λFB))]−E[UP (yFB(λFB), a∗(λFB))]
= H(a
◦
(λFB))−H(a∗(λFB)) > 0 (44)
The expression is positive because H(a) is decreasing in λ for a > a∗(0), and a∗(0) >
a◦(λFB) > a∗(λFB).
Proof of Proposition 7
From proposition 4, a binding SoP has diﬀerent consequences than an advisory vote if it
holds that
m < m := b◦(λA)− w, (45)
otherwise shareholders attain the same utility level under both forms of SoP. If condition
(45) holds, the shareholders’ utility equals
E[UP (y
FB(λB), a)] = yFB(λB) +H(a) + xL − w.
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where a < a◦(λA) and λB < λA. Suppose now that a > a◦(0) so that a◦(λB) = a. Since the
shareholders’ utility function is strictly concave in λ and maximized for 0 < λ∗ < λA, there
exists a range of values for λB for which the shareholders attain a higher utility level if the
SoP vote becomes binding. The lower bound of this range is given by the point where the
equation
E[UP (y
FB(λB), a)] ≥ E[UP (yFB(λN), a◦(λA))]. (46)
holds with equality. Assuming that (46) holds as a strict inequality for a = a◦(0) and using
the definitions of yFB and E[UP (·)], this condition becomes
H(a) ≤ ρ · λA +H(a◦(λA)). (47)
Since the right hand side of (47) is strictly positive and a = 0 for m = w from the proof of
proposition 4, there must exist a critical level m > w below which the shareholders’ utility
is strictly lower if the SoP becomes binding. Because a = C
0−1(b) = C 0−1(m − w), the
critical protection standard m is implicitly defined by the eﬀort level a that solves (47) with
equality.35
Proof of Corollary 4
A) Suppose first that the vote is advisory. To verify that a pre-contractual SoP yields a higher
utility than a post-contractual vote, suppose that λA+ = λA = λFB, so that shareholders are
better oﬀ with SoP. Since a+(λFB) ≤ a◦(λFB) from proposition 5, it must hold that
E[UP (y
FB(λ), a+(λ))] ≥ E[UP (yFB(λ), a◦(λ))]. (48)
As shown in proposition 5, the inequality is strict whenever s > w and θ is positive.
B) Suppose now that the vote becomes binding. As shown in the proof of corollary 3, the
enforceability of a pre-contractual vote does only aﬀect the players’ equilibrium strategies if
E[sA+] = a+(λA+) · C 0(a+(λA+))− w > E[t]
so that the majority of shareholders rejects the contract proposal of the board. Otherwise,
the shareholders’ utility is the same as with an advisory vote. Following the arguments
in corollary 3 and proposition 4, there must exist a range of eﬀort levels a◦(λB+) = a+
35 The solution assumes that a = C
0−1(m − w) < a◦(0). If this condition is not met, a solves H(a) =
ρ·(λA−λB+)+H(a◦(λA)), the rest of the argumant is identical to the case where a = C 0−1(m−w) < a◦(0).
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and corresponding board dependence levels λB+ for which the shareholders derive a higher
utility if the SoP becomes binding. The lower bound of this range is implicitly defined by
the condition
H(a+) ≥ ρ · (λA+ − λB+) +H(a+(λA+)), (49)
whenever there exists an eﬀort level a+ for which (49) holds with equality. Otherwise, the
shareholders always benefit if the pre-contractual SoP becomes binding. In fact, diﬀerent
from a post-contractual vote, the agents’ equilibrium eﬀort cannot become zero. That is,
since a+solves (41) and E[t] > w, it holds that a+ > 0 so that it is possible that (49) always
holds as a strict inequality.
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Figure 2: Sequence of events with pre-contractual vote 
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